Search results
Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory by Tore Ellingsen and Magnus Johannesson. Published in volume 98, issue 3, pages 990-1008 of American Economic Review, June 2008, Abstract: Desire for social esteem is a source of prosocial behavior. We develop a model in which actors' utility...
In this paper, we propose a model of motivation that is consistent with Theory Y and resolves these empirical puzzles. Our otherwise conventional principal-agent model builds on two key premises: First, some people care about social esteem. Second, the value of esteem depends on
Sep 19, 2006 · Abstract. Many people are sensitive to social esteem, and their pride is a source of pro-social behavior. We present a game-theoretic model in which sensitivity to esteem varies across players and may depend on context as well players' beliefs about their opponents.
Building on our theoretical work in Ellingsen and Johannesson (forthcoming), we then argue that many of these observations can be captured in a standard princi-pal–agent model, once the principals and the agents are assumed to care about respect or esteem as well as money.
Apr 1, 2004 · While investors rely as much on their own threats as on their trading partner's promises, the latter are more credible. Building on recent work in psychology and behavioural economics, we then present a simple model within which agents are concerned about both fairness and consistency.
Paying Respect by Tore Ellingsen and Magnus Johannesson. Published in volume 21, issue 4, pages 135-150 of Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 2007, Abstract: Why do people work? Economic theory generally, and the principal-agent model specifically, emphasize the role of material incentives.
Apr 1, 2004 · While investors rely as much on their own threats as on their trading partner's promises, the latter are more credible. Building on recent work in psychology and behavioural economics, we then present a simple model within which agents are concerned about both fairness and consistency.
